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The Banking Union: Agencies and the Lesson from the 
US  
Luigi Lonardo, Phd Candidate, King’s College London 
1. Introduction 
Independent agencies, despite not being new to the EU1, have proliferated since the 2008 
crisis. Agencies have been one of the legal responses common to both waves of the crisis: the 
2008-2012 financial crisis and the 2012 Euro-zone crisis2.  
The first wave sparked as regulatory response, since 2010, the creation of a the internal-
market-wide European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS)3. The ESFS is composed of 
National Competent Authorities as well as of new EU agencies, created to strengthen and 
control EU financial system governance. These agencies are the European Systemic Risk 
Board4; the three sectoral European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs): the European Banking 
Authority (EBA)5, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA)6, 
and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)7, and a Joint Committee, which 
coordinates them.  
The supervisory powers transferred to these ESAs were, as Moloney notices8, relatively 
contained. The considerations that limited the powers of the ESAs were political and legal. 
Politically, the fiscal costs which the initial series of crisis-era bank rescues by Member 
States imposed on domestic tax -payers9 shaped the profound resistance by some Member 
States10 to the transfer of executive powers with fiscal implications to the EU. Legally, the 
                                                          
1 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (OUP 2012) 144-146. 
2 Christos Hadjiemmanuil, “Bank Resolution Financing in the Banking Union” LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 6/2015, 5-6 constructs a slightly different narrative of the crisis, dividing in three waves.  
3 Together with two mechanisms originally formed outside the framework of the Union: first a temporary 
collective mechanism for economic rescue, the European Financial Stabilization Fund,
 
and then a permanent 
mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism. 
4 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on 
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk 
Board (EU) No 1092/2010. 
5 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision 
No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC.  
6 REGULATION (EU) No 1094/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 24 
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC.  
7 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending 
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC. 
8 Niamh Moloney, “European Banking Union: Assessing its Risks and Resilience” (2014) 51 Common Market 
Law Review 1609. 
9 The public capital injected into EU banks over 2008 - 2012 is estimated to be in the region of €413.2 billion, 
amounting to 3.2% of EU GDP in 2012: Commission, European financial stability and integration report 2013 
(2014), SWD (2014)170, p. 74. 
10 The main conflict line was between the UK (rigidly opposed to any transfer of powers with fiscal 
consequences) and often supported by Spain and the Czech Republic, and France, often supported by Italy,  
restrictions which apply to EU agencies under the Meroni doctrine limited the extent to which 
the European Supervisory Authorities could be empowered to take supervisory decisions11. 
However, by 2012 Euro area Member States entered a new phase of economic distress. The 
catastrophic consequences felt in some Euro-zone countries as a consequence of the 
sovereign crisis12, pushed MSs to set up the Banking Union, which entailed the transfer of 
significant supervisory and regulatory powers to the Single Supervisory Mechanism13 and the 
Single Resolution Mechanism14. However, given the high stakes of the decisions of these 
bodies, they give rise to concern of judicial protection, political and legal accountability. 
However, they have been established despite these concerns because it was felt necessary to 
overcome “political and legal obstacles previously thought insurmountable”15. In other 
words, it was the worsening of the crisis that forced the MSs to come up with such a solution.  
Is this choice justified?   
In order to answer this question, and to contribute at sketching a theoretical framework of 
administrative law under which to understand the developments of the Banking Union legal 
construction, this paper draws insight from the US experience.  
First, the paper explores the concern over the judicial and democratic control over the acts of 
two agencies created during the second wave, the Eurozone crisis. They are Banking Union 
agency, even though one of them, the Supervisory board, is technically not an agency. The 
Supervisory Board, of the ECB, for the purposes of this analysis, will be considered a de 
facto agency16.  
This paper considers the two most recent boards of appeals, which are independent 
commissions which resolve disputes related to the body or agency. They are established by 
secondary legislation in the context of the Banking Union: the SSM Resolution (together with 
a Decision of the ECB) and the SRM Resolution. These boards of appeals are ad hoc 
independent commissions which resolve disputes related to acts of the agency itself.  
The Administrative Board of Review carries out an internal administrative review of 
some decisions taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) regarding the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions.  
The Appeal Panel of the Single Resolution Mechanism. The Board of Appeal hears 
appeals against the decisions of the Single Resolution Board within the SRM. The paper 
explores the main legal issues that arise for the judicial protection of physical and legal 
persons who can challenge the measures of these agencies. 
 
                                                          
11 Case 9/56, Meroni v. High Authority [1957-1958] ECR 133. 
12C Hadjiemmanuil (n 2) 3. 
13 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central 
Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (hereinafter, the SSM 
regulation) 
14 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the 
resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (Hereinafter, SRM 
Regulation) 
15 N Moloney (n 8). 
16 Definition is also in Harlow and Rawlings, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Hart 2014) 292.  
Second, the paper draws insights from the creation of a unitary market in the United States. 
Much like the EU since 2008, nineteenth-century United States also experienced debt crises 
and default. The classical study of Skowroneck17 shows that the US reacted with new 
administrative capacities and policy instruments to preserve the market. Even before the 
establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, which marks the emergence 
of regulatory agencies, the expansive role for administrative discretion emerged under broad 
delegations of Congressional authority. As authors such as Mashaw and Perry18 have 
explained by analysing the role of administrative role in APD, the Congress generated 
substantial regulatory activity on the part of administrative agencies, through permissive 
acceptance of administrative adjudicatory and enforcement authority. Thus, APD offers an 
important reference point for understanding the institutional allocation of power. It shows 
that integration also passes by stages where agencies have to enjoy a rather large amount of 
discretion. 
 
This paper contributes to conceptualising the Euro-crisis by applying a “lesson” from 
American Political Development (APD) and Independent Agencies (IAs) in the European 
Union (EU). APD is the study of the evolution and integration of the market of the United 
States. It’s a multidisciplinary field of study, to which economists, lawyers, political scientists 
and historians contribute APD studies the construction and evolution of US institutions, 
broadly defined as to include for example the unitary market. Building, regulating and then 
liberalising an internal market, is arguably EU’s most vital task. The theories of APD can be 
applied to the latest Banking Union agencies in order to gain a better understanding of the 
fundamental tension between the need for specialised decision-making by unelected IAs and 
the commitment to be governed by the people. 
The paper argues that IAs may be necessary to achieve this aim. It explores a potential trade-
off between the potential loss of democratic scrutiny and more efficient governance. IAs may 
indeed prove –as a result of the crisis- to be a tool around which further integration will pivot. 
Absent sound finances, regulatory agencies may be the most efficient instrument to achieve 
the desired policies.  
  
                                                          
17 Stephen Skowroneck, Building a New American State. The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 
1877-1920 (CUP 1982). 
18 J. L. Mashaw and A. Perry, “Administrative Statutory Interpretation in the Antebellum Republic” (2009) 
7 Michigan State Law Review 7. 
2. Banking Union’s newest agencies 
 
In constitutional and administrative law, independent agencies enjoy a special19 and somehow 
ambiguous status. This is true for the EU and for the US alike. In the US are so-called 
independent agencies, those entities where at least one individual is appointed by the 
president to a full-time, fixed-term position with the advice and consent of the Senate and has 
protection, by statute or custom, against summary removal. These constitute what is 
sometimes referred to as  a “headless fourth branch” of the Government20, i.e., a haphazard 
deposit of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers. Despite this famous definition, 
however, American IAs rather range on a spectrum whereby each agency enjoys more or less 
independence and discretionary power depending on their statutory authority, structure, 
traditions, or culture21.  
The United States has known the administrative practice of delegating power to independent 
agencies at least since the late 19th century22. But while in the US "independence" is used 
with reference to the president23, or to the party system24, in the EU independence is best 
understood with reference to political games25, as a way of fostering integration without this 
passing by the political arena. 
The reasons for this preference are the problems to be addressed are highly technical and 
agencies have technical expertise to solve them26; that the economic principle of the division 
of labour allows political institutions to focus on core policy-making while specialised 
agencies concentrate on sectorial task.s; the spread of agencies beyond Brussels and 
Luxembourg adds to the visibility of the Union27; Agencies have proved particularly relevant 
in field of shared competences, when the implementation of new policies at Community level 
                                                          
19 Paul Verkuil, “The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies (1988) Duke Law Journal 257 
20 The president’s committee on administrative management, report of the committee with studies of 
administrative management in the federal government (1937).  
21 Marshall J. Breger and Gary J. Edles, Independent Agencies in the United States: Law, Structure, and Politics 
(OUP 2015). As a matter of example, many multimember agencies have the full range of regulatory authority, 
that is, they can issue rules, take administrative action to enforce their statutes and regulations, and decide cases 
through administrative adjudication. Some oversee a specific area of the economy. For example, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates interstate aspects of the electric power, natural gas, oil 
pipeline, and hydroelectric industries; and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) administers the 
federal securities law and regulates firms engaged in the purchase or sale of securities, investment companies, 
and people who provide investment advice. Others have substantive, subject-matter responsibilities that cut 
across industry lines. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces a variety of federal antitrust 
and consumer protection statutes. 
22  Marshall J. Breger and Gary J. Edles (n 21) 1. 
23 This was the understanding of the US Supreme Court in Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 624, 
625–26 (1935)  
24 Martin Shapiro, “The Problem of Independent Agencies in the United States and the European Union” (1997) 
4 Journal of European Public Policy 276. 
25 As poignantly explained by Shapiro almost twenty years ago: “If currently direct routes to further political 
integration of the Union are blocked, following Haas’s old arguments about the World Health Organization and 
the UN, further growth can be achieved indirectly through the proliferation of small, limited jurisdictions, 
allegedly ‘technical agencies’ that will appear politically innocuous”. Shapiro (n 24) 281 
26 Paul Craig, (n 1) 141. 
27 Communication from the commission to the European Parliament and the Council European agencies – The 
way forward Comm (2008) 323, 1. 
needs to be accompanied by close cooperation between the Member States and the EU28; that 
regulating a subject costs less than putting money on the market; or a mix of these29.  
However, the new agencies are troublesome from the standpoint of judicial protection. The 
problem is of the remedies available against the decisions of these agencies give rise to issues 
of political and legal accountability30. Not all agree with this analysis. Some commentators 
have taken the view that, as far as the SRM is concerned, “The rules on judicial protection 
follow contemporary standards in this field”31 and that the SRM’s judicial protections is “by 
and large, adequate”.32 
Some authors, instead, have voiced concerns about the the application of the rule of law to 
procedures followed by the SRB33. Others considered that "the scarce attention paid to the 
good governance values of due process and accountability” was "a striking feature" of the 
Commission’s original plans for banking supervision34. The principle of good administration 
is enshrined in Article 41 of the EU Charter of fundamental rights synthetizing some of the 
case law of the Court of Justice in this field35
 
is of particular relevance to administrative 
procedures. According to the Charter the right to good administration requires that decisions 
be taken pursuant to procedures which guarantee fairness, impartiality and timeliness36. An 
element of the good administration principle is the duty of care, which includes the right of 
every person to have his or her affairs handled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable 
time37. Impartiality requires the absence both of arbitrary action and of unjustified 
preferential treatment including personal interest38. The three institutions, in a 2012 joint 
statement, warned specifically on the importance of the impartiality and independence of the 
Members of the Boards of Appeals of regulatory agencies39.  
There is a tension between the struggle to efficiency and the need to ensure a standard of 
democratic accountability in line with the general principles of EU law and of the Charter of 
fund rights.  
 
                                                          
28 Comm 2008 (n 27) 323, 5. 
29 Commission, The operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies COM(2002) 718 final , p 10. 
30 See below Section 2.3 Areas of tension 
31 Georgios I. Psaroudakis & Basil C. Scouteris Greek report, XXVII FIDE Congress (Vol 1, Wolters Kluwers 
2016) 22. 
32 Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou and Phoebus L. Athanassiou,Cypriot report, XXVII FIDE Congress (Vol, Wolters 
Kluwers 2016) 21. 
33 Eilis Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer Payne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation (OUP 
2015) 478, with reference to the SRB adoption of a resolution scheme.  
34 C Harlow and R Rawlings (n 16) 294. 
35 The CJEU has referred to good administration principles since the very early case-law: Joined Cases 7/56, 
3/57 to 7/57 Algera and Others v Common Assembly of the ECSC [1957] ECR 0039; Case 32/62 Alvis [1963] 
ECR 49, para 1A; Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299; Case 64/82 
Tradax v Commission [1984] ECR 1359; see the Explanations Relating to the Charter Of Fundamental Rights, 
Doc. 2007/C 303/02, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri 
=OJ:C:2007:303:0017:0035:en:PDF 
36 Directorate General for internal policies, “The General Principles of EU Administrative Procedural 
Law”2015, 18 
37 Art 41(1) Charter. 
38 Case T-146/89 Williams v Court of Auditors [1991] ECR II-1293, para. 40; Case T-305/94 Limburgse Vinyl 
Maatschappij v Commission [1999] ECR II-931, paras. 317ff. 
39 Joint statement on decentralised agencies and the subsequent common approach of Parliament, the Council 
and the Commissions signed on June 19, 2012. 
2.1 The Administrative Board of Review (ABR) 
The SSM regulation requires the ECB to establish an ABR40 and to adopt a decision setting 
out its operating rules, with the objectives of strengthening the legal protection of natural and 
legal persons and for reasons of procedural economy41.
 
In compliance with this provision, the 
ECB has adopted a decision on 14 April 2014 establishing the ABR and its Operating 
Rules42. The analysis that follows is structures around four questions: what acts can be 
challenged before the board? By whom? On what ground? And what are the effects of the 
challenge? 
 
 
- What can be challenged? 
 
Under Art 24(1) SSM Regulation  and 7(1) ABR Decision, the ABR hears appeals on the 
decisions adopted by the ECB in the exercise of its supervisory tasks as they have been 
conferred upon it by the SSM mechanism. 
 
- By whom?  
 
Pursuant to Article 24 (5) SSM Regulation, any natural or legal person may request a review 
of an ECB decision if such decision is addressed, or is of a direct and individual concern, to 
that person. These requirements are the same as in an action for annulment pursuant to 
Article 263 (4) TFEU, therefore the case law of the CJEU should be applicable to determine 
the rules on standing. A request for review to the ABR (called a ‘notice of review’ in the 
ABR Decision) shall be made in writing, including a statement of grounds. The time limit is 
one month from the date of notification of the decision to the person requesting the review, 
or, in the absence of a notification, of the day on which it became known to such person. 
 
- On what grounds? 
 
If the request is admissible, the ABR carries out an internal administrative review with regard 
to the procedural and substantive conformity of supervisory decisions with the SSM 
Regulation43. In the light of Article 4 (3) SSMR, this means that the ABR will fully review 
the legality of the decision against the entire corpus of Union law and, this include, crucially, 
national implementing law, as applied by the ECB. Pursuant to the ABR Decision, the legal 
review shall, however, be limited to an examination of the grounds relied on by the applicant 
as set out in the notice of review,
 
making careful preparation of the notice of review 
essential44. However, this restriction may be in contrast with the SSM Regulation. Article 24 
SSM Regulation does not contain any such limitation. Moreover, the ABR Decision itself 
explicitly states that, when preparing a new draft decision, the Supervisory Board will not be 
limited to an examination of the grounds relied upon by the applicant in the notice of review. 
 
- What are the effects? 
 
                                                          
40 For an overview: The SSM Framework Regulation. Part 2: Administrative procedure, legal remedies and 
transitional provisions, June 2014. 
41 Preamble SSM Regulation. 
42 Decision of the European Central Bank of 14 April 2014 concerning the establishment of an Administrative 
Board of Review and its Operating Rules (ECB/2014/16) (Herein, the ABR Decision).  
43 Art 10(1) ABR Decision, Art 24(1) SSM Regulation. 
44 Art 10(2) ABR Decision. 
Much though actions for annulment before the CJEU, a request for review submitted to the 
ABR pursuant to Article 24 (5) SSM Regulation does not automatically have suspensory 
effect of the appealed decision. However, the Governing Council, upon a proposal being 
made by the ABR directly to it and not via the Supervisory Board, may suspend the 
application of the decision under review.
 
If the applicant wishes to apply for the review to be 
given suspensory effect, it shall state the grounds for such application.
 
The ABR Decision 
provides that the request for review must be admissible and not obviously unfounded In 
addition, it must be established that the immediate application of the contested decision may 
cause irreparable damage to the applicant. 
Moreover, under Article 34 SSMFR the ECB may suspend, ex officio, the application of a 
supervisory decision in the initial decision itself, or, even outside of a review procedure 
before the ABR, upon the request of the addressee of a supervisory decision.  
 
If the request is deemed admissible, the ABR expresses its opinion on the matter brought to 
its attention “within a period appropriate to its urgency, but no later than two months from the 
receipt of the request”. The opinion shall be in writing and contain reasons.
 
The opinion of 
the ABR, however, is not binding, and does not automatically replace the decision of the 
ECB. The ABR simply remits the case for preparation of a new draft decision to the 
Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board shall, taking into account the opinion of the ABR, 
but not being limited to the grounds relied upon by the applicant in the notice of review,
 
promptly submit a new draft decision to the Governing Council. This new decision either 
abrogates the initial decision, replaces it with a decision of identical content, or replaces it 
with an amended decision. It shall be deemed adopted unless the Governing Council objects 
to it within a maximum period of ten working days. Crucially, a review of this new decision 
of the Governing Council cannot be requested before the ABR.
 
In this case, if the applicant 
wants to appeal the new decision, the only available avenue is applying for judicial review 
with the CJEU under Art 263 TFEU.  
 
 
2.2 Appeal Panel of the SRM 
The SRM Regulation45, Art 85, provides for the establishment of an Appeal Panel (AP) to 
hear claims concerning the decisions of the Single Resolution Board. The Single Resolution 
Board (SRB), which was established on 1 January 2015 and is operative since 1st January 
2016, is a Brussels based agency with legal personality and independent finances. In its 
plenary session, the SRB comprises its chair, the vice-chair, four permanent members and 
representatives of the national resolution authorities of all participating Member States. The 
ECB and the European Commission have observer status in the SRB. The SRB is the 
resolution authority of the Banking Union, and it was set up in order to ensure an orderly 
resolution of failing banks in participating Member States, with minimum impact on public 
finances and taxpayers. 
-What can be challenged? 
                                                          
45 For an overview: Christos Gortsos, The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the Single Resolution Fund 
(SRF). A comprehensive review of the second main pillar of the European Banking Union (ECEFIL, 2nd ed, 
2016) 67. 
The AP can hear appeals lodged against a decision of the Board referred to in Article 10(10) 
on the assessment of resolvability, Article 11 on the application of simplified obligations or 
the waiver of the obligation to draft resolution plans, Article 12(1) on the minimum 
requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities, Articles 38 to 41 on the imposition of 
fines and periodic penalty payments, Article 65(3) on the contribution to the board’s 
administrative expenditures, Article 71 on the raising of extraordinary ex-post contribution 
and Article 90(3) on access to documents 46. Finally, it is worth noting that there is no 
possibility to appeal the decisions regarding actual bank resolution under Art. 18 of the 
Regulation. 
-By whom? 
As far as the rules on standing are concerned, Art 85(3) SRM Regulation uses the usual 
formulation, that the decision has to be addressed to the natural or legal person challenging it, 
or has to be of “direct and individual concern”. The applicant has six weeks to appeal. 
 
-On what grounds? 
The legislation does not mention on what grounds can the AP review the decisions. It is 
therefore debatable whether the applicant can question only the legality of the challenged 
measure or also extend the claim to the substantial correctness of the relative technical 
evaluations. Chirulli and De Lucia hold the opinion that, given the open wording of the 
specific norm, which refer only to “the complaint of the interested party”, the applicant is not 
barred to challenge the decision even on substantive grounds. This means that AP would be 
able to review procedural and technical aspects as well as the merits of the contested 
decision47. 
 
- What are the Effects? 
An appeal lodged pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not have suspensive effect.  
However, the Appeal Panel may, if it considers that circumstances so require, suspend the 
application of the contested decision48. The Appeal Panel may only either confirm the 
decision taken by the Board, or remit the case to the latter. The Board shall be bound by the 
decision of Appeal Panel and it shall adopt an amended decision regarding the case 
concerned49  
The decision of the Board of Appeal is binding, and, under Art 86(1), it can be challenged 
before the CJEU: in accordance with art 263 TFEU contesting a decision taken by the Appeal 
Panel or, where there is no right of appeal to the Appeal Panel, by the Board. Or under 265 
for failure to act of the board. 
2.3 Areas of tension 
 
Neither the Administrative Board of review nor the Appeal Panel have yet handled a single 
case. Therefore, at this stage, only a description of the potential legal issues is possible. It is 
however already apparent that the law which set up these bodies give rise to some tensions: 
there are issues, faced by the natural or legal person who lodges the appeal (the applicant) of 
transparency, of cost, and of procedural safeguards.   
                                                          
46 Art 85(3) SRM Regulation. 
47 Paola Chirulli and Luca De Lucia, “Specialised Adjudication in EU Administrative Law: the Boards of 
Appeal of EU agencies” (2015) European Law Review 832, 846. 
48 85(6) SRM Regulation. 
49 85(8) SRM Regulation. 
To begin with, the ABR does not have binding powers. It means that it is always the 
Supervisory Board who has the ultimate saying on the matter, since it can disregard the 
opinion of the ABR and re-adopt a decision of identical content (subject to the Governing 
Council not objecting within ten days)50. The independent body, therefore, does not really act 
as a judicial organ and its powers are very limited. The SSM Regulation at Art 24(11) states 
that the setting up and functioning of the ABR is without prejudice to the right to bring 
proceedings before the CJEU in accordance with the Treaties.  
However, starting proceeding before the CJEU, which is possible both under Art 24(11) SSM 
Regulation and under Art 86(1) SRM Regulation, is costly and time consuming (procedural 
economy was indeed one of the reasons for the creation of the ABR). In particular, as far the 
SRM is concerned, it is possible to appeal decisions of the BoA to the CJEU, or those 
decisions of the SRB where there is no appeal possibility to the Panel. Such actions to the 
CJEU must be brought in accordance with Art. 263 TFEU. If the action is well founded, the 
CJEU is to declare the act concerned to be void (Art. 264 TFEU). Proceedings before the 
CJEU are not only burdensome in terms of money51, but also in terms of time52. The time 
element is particularly striking if compared The particular nature of the decisions taken 
especially by the SRB makes it so that having to wait, in average, more than one year before 
the CJEU issues a ruling53, frustrates the purpose of the decision and of the review.  
 
Another fundamental problem is that it may be difficult if not impossible for applicants to 
comply with the time limitation of Art 263(6) TFEU (within two months of the publication of 
the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the day on 
which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be), if they have to pass through 
the AP or the ABR before. This problem is avoided only if the applicants can challenge the 
new decision (that substitutes the previous one, even if identical) within those time limits.  
 
The proceedings before the ABR and the AP also presents difficulties in access to documents. 
The two panels cannot undertake any further investigation or collect fresh evidence on their 
own initiative54.  
Moreover, as Chirulli and De Lucia noted55, even though the European Courts define them as 
"quasi-jurisdictional bodies"56, the board of appeals of EU agencies in general (and thus 
certainly the SRM AP) do not have formal judicial powers and cannot be considered courts. 
This means that the applicant cannot properly rely on a right to a “fair hearing” 57. 
                                                          
50 Art 24(7) SSM Regulation. 
51 Even though proceedings before the CJEU are not necessarily more costly than those before the appeal 
panels. The other Appeal Panels of EU agencies foresee an application costs, the CJEU does not. The AP of the 
SRM and the ABR have not yet established an application cost to begin proceedings before them.  
52 See the Court’s case law on lengthy proceedings C ase C‑50/12 P, Kendrion v Commission [2013] ECR- 771, 
Case C‑58/12 P, Groupe Gascogne [2013] ECR 770, Case C‑40/12 P, Gascogne [2013] 768. Proceedings of 
reasonable duration are a right under Article 47 of the Charter (which provides that “everyone is entitled to a fair 
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”) and 
are related to the principle of effective judicial protection. 
53 “In the case of direct actions, the average time in 2015 was 17.6 months, which amounts to a significant 
reduction compared with the preceding years (between 19.7 months and 24.3 months in the period from 2011 to 
2014)” http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-03/cp160034en.pdf . 
54 Art 15 ABR Decision  
55 Chirulli and De Lucia (n 47) 
56 Case T-133/08, Schräder v CPVO — Hansson [2010] ECR 430, par 137 and 190.   
57 Case T-63/01, Procter & Gamble v OHIM [2002] ECR II-5255. 
 Finally, it could be argued 58that the lack of a possibility to appeal the decisions on resolution 
is an infringement of the right to property enshrined in the Unions Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (Art. 17(1)), and the CJEU has also recognised this for the first time in Case 44/79 
Hauer.59  
                                                          
58 See eg the Finnish report, FIDE XXVII Cogress (Vol 1, Wolters Kluwer 2016) 21. 
59 Case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR I-3727. 
3. The lesson from APD  
The study of American political development—APD—emerged in the early 1980s as subfield 
of the study of American Politics. It seeks to analyse political contemporary phenomena 
through a diachronic lens60,. APD as a field of study is shaped by historians, economists, 
lawyers and political scientists alike. The field has been described as “insurgent” because it 
“brings the idea that “history matters” into the center of political analysis and prizes fresh 
answers to questions that are never taken for granted within APD”61 
APD has studied the simultaneous transformation of institutions and polity, and how these 
generated substantial protest about prevailing economic and democratic conditions. The 
dynamics that were encountered by the US (expanding market, expanded administrative 
capacity, trade-off between democratic legitimacy and economic efficiency, market activities, 
and corresponding industrial developments, and durable inequalities) are relevant for the 
current debates in Europe. It is so because the EU can draw lessons from the regulatory and 
administrative mechanisms which, in 19th century America, fostered market consolidation. 62 
Scholars of the EU have had recourse to APD both to explain other EU policy-making areas63 
as they have in order to deal with economic governance64 or fundamental rights65 by 
comparing the EU’s experience to an external benchmark (the US). When it comes to 
economic governance, literature on both sides of the Atlantic has focused on the path that, 
through market relations66, have accompanied the move from singular states to unions67. 
These studies have considered factors – from corporate governance structures to issues of 
state sovereignty – which had an impact on administration and regulation. Crucially, the key 
finding for EU lawyers is that the development of the US in the 19th century has resulted in a 
                                                          
60 The fundamental work by Paul Pierson, “Politics in Time” for example, has a threefold purpose: to advocate 
that political scientists situate arguments in temporal perspective, to illustrate a number of ways in which they 
might do so, and to argue that much of the discipline does not presently take time seriously enough. Paul 
Pierson. Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. (Princeton University Press 2004). 
61 Suzanne Mettler and Richard Valelly, “The Distinctiveness and Necessity of American Political 
Development” in Richard Valelly, Suzanne Mettler, and Robert Lieberman (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
American Political Development (OUP 2016). 
62 Egan, Single Markets: Economic Integration in Europe and the United States (OUP 2015).  
63 Anand Menon, “Defence Policy and the European State: Insights from American Experience” in D King and 
P Le Gales (eds), The Reconfiguration of the State in Europe (OUP 2015). Robert Schütze, From Dual to 
Cooperative Federalism. The Changing Structure of European Law (OUP 2009) 59. 
64 Federico Fabbrini, Economic Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges 
(OUP 2016).  
65 Federico Fabbrini, Fundamental Rights in Europe: Challenges and Transformations in Comparative 
Perspective (OUP 2014) 
66 Michelle Egan (n 62); M Egan “Toward a New History in European Law: New Wine in Old Bottles” (2013) 
28 (5) American University International Law Review 1223; M Egan, “Single Market” in E Jones, A Menon 
and S Weatherill, The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (OUP 2012); Michelle Egan, “The Emergence 
of the US Internal Market”, in J. Pelkmans, D. Hanf, and M.Chang (eds), The EU Internal Market in 
Comparative Perspective: Economic, Political, and Legal Perspectives (Peter Lang Publishers 2008). 
67 A Glencross, What Makes the EU Viable? European Integration in the Light of the Antebellum US Experience 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2007); A Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing Legitimacy in 
the European Union.” (2002) 40 (4) JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 603; A Menon, and M. A. 
Schain (eds), Comparative Federalism: The European Union and the United States in Comparative Perspective 
(OUP 2006); JD Donahue and M. A. Pollack, “Centralization and its Discontents: The Rhythms of Federalism 
in the United States and the European Union” in K. Nicolaïdis and R. Howse (eds), The Federal Vision: 
Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the United States and the European Union (OUP 2001) 
significant expansion of the institutional capacity of the American state over two centuries 
with a similar discernible pattern of institutional development in Europe68.  
In terms of administrative capacities, the standard narrative is that before the Civil War the 
US was a relatively weak state69. This was also true with regard to military capacity.70 
However, authors such Mashaw and Perry have pointed out that the State weakness, if it 
existed, had no influence on the development of administrative capacity71. The account of the 
surge of the American State considers that it was vastly strengthened after the Civil War, for 
it had to respond to pressures to increase its security requirements. This critic period has been 
a major turning point in US administrative law. Thus, military capacity as an essential 
element of state-building was a catalyst of American development72.  
3.1 Independent agencies in American development  
The end of the Civil War also witnessed the birth of the modern independent regulatory 
agency, which emerged at the federal level began in the late nineteenth century. The first was 
the Interstate Commerce Commission, instituted in 1887 by the Congress. The ICC was the 
first federal agency, but even before its establishment several states utilized the regulatory 
commission structure in their attempts to regulate the railroad industry.73  
After the ICC was set up, the US saw, together with the centralisation of power74 and the re-
building of the nation state75 an increase in its administrative capacities to regulate 
phenomena of federal interest. An aspect of this renewal of Washington’s power was an 
outgrowth of federal agencies (which in turn derived from the state commission movement 
which dated back to the early Nineteenth century76). The work of Mashaw as well links the 
centralisation of national administrative law with the growth and development of national 
administrative statutory law in three phases77. As Egan sums up, “[t]he expansive role for 
administrative discretion emerged under broad delegations of Congressional authority that 
generated substantial regulatory activity on the part of administrative agencies, contributing 
towards the consolidation and growth of state power, through permissive acceptance of 
administrative adjudicatory and enforcement authority”78. 
                                                          
68 Egan (n 62); Pollack, S. 2009. War, Revenue, and State Building: Financing the Development of the American 
State. Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press. 
69 Keohane, R. O. 2002. “International Commitments and American Political Institutions in the Nineteenth 
Century.” In Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development, ed. I. 
Katznelson and M. Shefter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
70 Anand Menon, “Defence Policy and the European State: Insights from American Experience” in D King and 
P Le Gales (eds), The Reconfiguration of the State in Europe (OUP 2015). 
71 Mashaw and Perry (n 18) 
72 Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development, ed. I. Katznelson 
and M. Shefter. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 83 
73 Breger Edles (n 21) 20 
74 Donahue and M. A. Pollack (n 67) 85 
75 Skowroneck (n 17) 
76 Robert Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions 26 (1972) (“[I]n 1887, ten states had set up 
‘strong’ commissions…possessing actual rate-making powers.”). 
77 J. L. Mashaw, 2006. “Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801.” Yale 
Law Journal 115 (6): 1256–344; Mashaw, J. L. 2007. “Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and 
Administration Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829.” Yale Law Journal, 116 (8): 1636–740 ; Mashaw, J. L., 
and A. Perry (n 18). 
78 Egan (n 62). 
However, much as for the Banking Union agencies considered earlier in this paper, a 
remarkable feature of the agencies established at the federal level in the Nineteenth 
century was the scant need felt for executive direction and control, including, crucially, 
little judicial review of administrative action.79 More generally, a recent commentator of US 
administrative law has considered that “The administrative state seems to have a democracy 
problem” and that “concern over the democratic legitimacy of administrative power, 
together with related concerns over its constitutionality, have been abiding preoccupations 
for scholars, officials, and reformers”80. The state of the play on judicial review of executive 
acts was expressed in a punchy sentence by one the authorities of US administrative law, 
Kenneth Culp Davis: “The presumption was one of unreviewability throughout the 19th 
century.”81  
This attitude of several actors involved is derived not only from the ruling of Courts, but also 
from the behaviour of states attorneys. As far as the Supreme Court is concerned, Breger and 
Edles state that “over the course of the nineteenth century, the Court was extremely reluctant 
to review executive decisions. As an example—albeit extreme from a modern perspective—
the Court refused to compel the secretary of the navy to pay Stephen Decatur’s widow her 
pension, as required by a private act of Congress. Decatur v. Paulding82. Rather than ruling 
on the merits, the Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the action fell within the 
secretary’s discretionary power”83. Equally, state attorneys (then called district attorneys) 
enjoyed considerable independence from the executive branch.84 This is because early 
attorneys general understood the opinions clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789,85 to be a 
limitation on their authority, rather than the basis to control legal opinions throughout the 
executive branch.86 The state attorneys’ interpretation allowed district attorney to conduct 
federal prosecution free from the control and jurisdiction of the attorney general87. 
Even though this “minimalist”88 approach to judicial review of executive power was 
reconsidered following the Civil War, it was only in 1897, that the Supreme Court reviewed 
                                                          
79 Frederic P. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 Geo. L.J. 287, 292–93 
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86 See Lawrence Lessig, Readings by Our Unitary Executive, 15 Cardozo l. rev. 175, 183–85 (1993);  see also 
Keith S. Brown & Adam Candeub, independent agencies and the unitary executive debate: an empirical critique 
10 (Mich. State Univ. College of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 06-04), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100125## (“While the Judiciary Act of 1789 
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87 For a full account, Breger and Edles (n 21) 20-22. 
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an ICC act89. And the presumption of unreviewability, however, was not reversed until the 
Court’s 1902 decision in American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty.90 Judicial 
reviewability of agency action in the post–Administrative Procedure Act (APA) era was later 
expressly established in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner91. 
Notwithstanding this “democratic deficit” and the problems of legal accountability of the 19th 
century agencies, several studies suggest that it was precisely the expansion of administrative 
law and steady growth of regulation to achieve market consolidation that strengthened the 
role of the state and underpinned American political–economic development92. 
It is worth mentioning that today, judicial review of agency action is thought as beneficial 
also because of “information forcing”, in the sense that it helps other branches of State to 
acquire useful information from the agency93. Moreover, judicial review ensures that the 
agency bases its decision on a reasoned analysis of relevant information94:  “Fully aware of 
the consequences of a judicial remand, the agencies are constantly ‘looking over their 
shoulders’ at the reviewing courts in preparing supporting documents, in writing preambles, 
in responding to public comments, and in assembling the rulemaking ‘record.’” 95. An aspect 
of Judicial Review of independent agencies action is the so called Chevron deference, which 
consists of a two-steps enquiry: two-step inquiry –whether Congress has left a statutory 
ambiguity and if the agency’s interpretation in resolving this ambiguity is reasonable. If the 
test is met, then the Court cannot review the statutory interpretation made by the agency. 
However, some authors have argued against applying Chevron deference to independent 
agencies. In particular, Randolph May is championing the cause of jurisprudential change in 
this area.96He argues on the grounds of accountability, separation of powers and democratic 
concerns that judicial review should be more intense in the case of independent agencies 
because their characteristics diminish their democratic pedigree.  
4. Conclusion 
 
                                                          
89 The SC rejected the ICC’s conclusion that its statutory power to determine the reasonableness of rates 
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reasoning processes of the regulator and force it to spend more of its resources on producing information).  
94 Sharkey, Catherine M., "State Farm 'with Teeth': Heightened Judicial Review in the Absence of Executive 
Oversight" (2014). New York University Public Law and Legal eory Working Papers. Paper 463, 117 
95 Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1412 
(1992).  
96 Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 453 (2006).  
What is the Banking Union and what may be its developments? This paper has argued that 
the APD offers a conceptual framework to theorise the role of independent agencies and their 
internal mechanisms of review. Further research may expand the analysis to the whole 
Banking Union system and offer a theoretical framework for understanding its standing under 
administrative law. 
 
European lawyers can learn a great deal from the US political development, as the abundant 
literature on the comparison between the two entities witnesses. This paper has concentrated 
on the newest developments of the Banking Union, and has found that the lesson from the US 
can be of tolerating the constant tension between independent, unelected agencies and the 
commitment of being governed by the people.   
 
In order to tackle the Eurozone sovereign crisis, the EU has adopted a new legal structure, the 
Banking Union, for the supervision and resolution of participating MSs credit institutions. As 
part of the SSM and of the SRM, a de facto agency (the Supervisory Board in the ECB) and 
an agency (the SRB) have been instituted. The article has considered the legal issues arising 
from the possible judicial review of these agencies’ acts, and has highlighted the main 
concern on the legal accountability of these bodies, and on the effective judicial protection of 
applicants who wish to challenge the agencies’ decisions.  
The decision to delegate power to agencies has major repercussion on the fundamental 
political organisation of the polity97, in the EU much as it had in the US.  
 
Worryingly low standards of judicial review have been studied in the American experience of 
political and administrative development in the second half of the 19th century. To control 
critical areas of the common market – namely those which may have been subject to 
monopolies, such as roads and railways – the federal state developed also through an 
outgrowth of independent agencies, which, at least initially, enjoyed large discretion and 
were not subject to judicial review.  
 
Notwithstanding this “democratic deficit” and the problems of legal accountability of the 19th 
century agencies, it was precisely the expansion of administrative law and steady growth of 
regulation to achieve market consolidation that strengthened the role of the state and 
underpinned American political–economic development.  
 
Integration of complex polities such as that of the US as it emerged from the Civil War, and 
of the EU as it is now, passes through phases of market building in which it may be 
necessary, for the expansion and strengthening of the State’s administrative capacity, to 
overlook concerns of judicial protection. The delegation of highly discretionary power may 
be a necessitated step.  
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